Friday Quick Graphs: When did “Score Effects” Emerge in NHL History?

Back in 2009, Tyler Dellow first elaborated on the idea of what we now call “score effects,” or how teams with a lead will go into a “defensive shell” and purposely withdraw from the possession battle to preserve their score. Score effects are the primary reason the go-to possession stat is “Fenwick Close” today – the “close” implies the importance of looking at possession measures when teams still have a reason to engage. The limits of historical shot recording, and the possibility of score effects, are precisely why I’ve advocated the use of 2pS% (shot-differential percentage from the first two periods) as an historical possession measure.

The one thing I never completely took for granted was that score effects had always existed in the NHL. To test this, I broke down each game into individual period shot battles, and looked separately at the correlation* of 1st, 2nd, or 3rd period shots-for percentages to final goals-for percentages. The result above clearly shows that the 3rd period SF% begins to drop away drastically after 1977 or so, after a quarter-century of running pretty close to the others. It does seem possible, then, that the re-introduction of overtime in 1983-84 (gone since 1943-44) had an impact on the growth of score effects (although I’m not sure how); on the other hand, the introduction of the “loser point” in 1999-2000 doesn’t seem to have had any effect. We can also do a similar graph of correlations to goals-for percentage to validate the use of 2pS%:

As you can see, score effects have essentially become the norm, much to the detriment of overall shot differential. At any rate, whomever put two-and-two together back in the 1970s probably had the right idea; I’d forward the hypothesis that the 1970s NHL was ripe for change and innovation (a lot of competition; growth of league = increase in decision-makers and opportunities to exploit market inefficiencies). In that kind of environment, protecting the lead quickly became a best practice, and it steadily grew to a league-wide practice by the mid-1990s or so.

* Or a -1.0 to +1.0 relationship of the variance in one variable to the variance in another; positive means as one goes up, the other tends to go up, suggesting a positive relationship or correlation. A negative correlation suggests that, as one goes up, the other tends to go down. The closer to 0.0, the less likely the variables have any relationship at all.

The Top “Young Guns” in NHL History

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Photo by “Djcz” via Wikimedia Commons

I don’t think we engage the idea of the place in history that many of today’s best players hold, and I partly attribute that to the difficulty of finding points of comparison across generations. Simply using raw scoring data doesn’t do the best job because a.) everyone knows Gretzky wins, and b.) we know that scoring fluctuated drastically in the 1980s, and it wasn’t because all the best shooters and passers were playing then. With that in mind, I’ve stewed over ways to bring these different generations together, in such a way that we can be comfortable comparing them. It’s led me to build a couple of metrics that move a little bit away from the counting statistics (G, A, PTS) and towards some metrics that demonstrate a player’s share of their team’s results.

The two metrics I’m focusing on for these young guns both relate to offensive measures, but I think that generally they also allude to a player’s importance to play overall. I tend to agree with Vic Ferrari’s assertion (see his third comment here) that forwards and only a select number of defensemen play much of a role in driving offense, and recalling some of the player types implicated in Steve Burtch’s work over at Pension Plan Puppets on Shut-Down Index, I’d propose that players that drive possession (forwards and defense) more generally will return some signals in regards to shooting or playmaking. Whether that simply means, in the future, we’ll get more from simply looking at passes and shots (or robots will do the whole darn thing and save me the trouble), I can’t say. For now, though, I created %TSh, or percentage of team shots, which expresses the proportion of team shooting a player does (in games they played), and %TA, which does the same exercise with team assists. While the issue of whether this expresses positive possession players is ripe for debate, it’s indisputable that players strong in these metrics will be drivers of offense for their teams.

In that spirit, I wanted to delve into some nifty historical data; I’ve been able to go all the way back to 1967-68 with data on %TSh and %TA, and it returns some fascinating studies on NHL legends vis-à-vis today’s stars. For this piece, I’m focusing on the players that get everyone excited, so-called “young guns,” or players under 25 that have already demonstrated their ability at the top level. How do contemporary young guns measure up all-time?

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Friday Quick Graphs: Shooting and Playmaking Contributions, 1967-68 through 2012-13

I’ve just finished a pretty massive dataset, so I’m geeking out a bit over what I can do with it. Just the beginning, above…this is the distribution of %TSh (player shots divided by estimated team shots in games they played) and %TA (same equation, but with assists) season performances, 20+ GP, from 1967-68 through 2012-13. Per recent arguments about Ovechkin, I’ve added lines showing where his best season (2008-09) and most recent full season (2012-13) fall on the list; his current season would fall approximately in the same place as last season.

Those of you who’ve been following me on Twitter know that I’ve put together a pretty substantial dataset, and I’ve been working through the data with a metric I’ve used for a while. %TSh is a player’s shots divided by his team’s estimated shot total in games they played (Team Shots / Team GP, multiplied by player GP). The measure gives us an idea of the player’s shooting contribution to the team’s offense. It moves outside the pesky variance of shooting percentage and gets closer to a stable indicator of offensive role. I’ve done the same with %TA, which is the same equation for assists. The reason for estimated team totals is we don’t yet have good macro-data on specific games that players played before 1987-88, but the metric runs essentially in lock-step with the real thing and I want to provide a useful, historical point of comparison. Doing this allows us to look 20 years further back.

The distribution above includes over 23,000 player seasons over 20 GP; the orange distribution is %TA, and black is %TSh. I used the marks to connect back to the previous week’s bizarre flame war over Ovechkin’s value and approach to the game; the top one shows Ovechkin’s peak year, 2008-09 (20%), which also happens to be the highest %TSh of all-time. The bottom mark is Ovechkin’s 2012-13 (16.3%), which I’m using because his current season is just slightly higher – it would be good for 16th best in NHL history.

I also did a second graph, wanting to look at the relationship of %TSh to %TA, to see just how much they ran together:

Related to the previous post, I decided to see if the relationship between TSh% and %TA was too close to tell me anything. %TSh is on the x-axis, and %TA is on the y. As you can see, they do run together, which is okay, because rebounds can result in assists for the shooter, and players with a lot of shots will generally be engaged in the offense in all ways. That being said, it’s not so close that they aren’t distinctive. The plot above does look scattered enough for these two metrics to tell us something apart from one another.

In the graph above, the x-axis is %TSh, and the y-axis %TA. Intuitively, these run together a fair amount, as shots create rebounds that can be counted as assists, and a player that shoots a lot is likely to be more heavily involved in the entire offense. That said, they don’t run nearly so close together as to render either measure moot. I think %TA can be a valuable counter-weight for assessing defensemen. Anyway, this is the tip of an enormous iceberg of data, so don’t be surprised to see me refer to and use %TSh and %TA again.

Outperforming PDO: Mirages and Oases in the NHL

Above is the progressive stabilization (game-by-game, cumulatively) of all-situations PDO over time for the 30 NHL teams. It’s a demonstration of the pull of PDO towards the average (1000, or the addition of team SV% and shooting percentage with decimals removed), and it gives you a sense of the end game: an actual spread of PDO, from roughly 975 to roughly 1025. In other words, if you were just to use this data, you could probably conclude that it’s not outside expectations for a team to outperform 1000 by about 25 (or 2.5%) on either side.

That’s all well and good, but PDO is a breakdown of two very different things, a team’s shooting and goaltending, two variables that understandably have very little to do with each other (they are slightly related because rink counting bias usually affects both). Shooting percentage can hinge on a number of contextual variables, though its reliance on a team’s player population usually can bring it a bit in-line with league averages. Save percentage, on the other hand, hinges on one player, and what’s more past performances suggest that a single goaltender can quite significantly outperform expectations. In this piece, I want to jump into the sliding variables of PDO, and what we can expect from teams, but first I want to begin with why I’m working with all-situations PDO.

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Friday Quick Graph: Season Stories Using % of Team Shots, Gretzky, Lemieux, Sheppard, and Simpson in 1987-88

This takes the progressive, cumulative percentage of team shots from the graphs below and compares them to one another (to view the original charts: Simpson, Sheppard, Lemieux, Gretzky). It really establishes how greatly Lemieux mattered to the Penguins…Gretzky had plenty of teammates taking over the shots, especially as he was dinged up during the season and players like Messier and Kurri were helping carry the load (not to mention Simpson and his 43 goals in 59 games). Any surprise Lemieux was one season away from 85 goals and nearly 200 points? Any surprise Simpson was already coming down from what would prove to be a career year? Any surprise that Sheppard was moving towards a quality career? These %TSh charts can really lend to interesting seasonal and career narratives.

Part of the reason I like doing graph work is because a good graph (with a little bit of contextual knowledge) can tell a really interesting story. In the past, I’ve been a proponent of digging deeper into the historical data, and noted that even though we have less data of the pre-BTN era it doesn’t mean we can’t make some intriguing graphs. %TSh, or % of team shots (in the games a player participated), provides a great opportunity to do just that, not just in a player’s career (as I’ve done before) but also over the course of a season. In the graph above, I took two well-known players, Mario Lemieux and Wayne Gretzky, and matched them to two (to the younger readers) lesser-known players from 1987-88, Ray Sheppard and Craig Simpson; I expressed their %TSh cumulatively, game-by-game. Craig Simpson, at the tender age of 20, was having the best year of his career (56 goals on an incredible 31.6% shooting percentage), but a trade to the Oilers mid-season would alter his offensive role for that season and into the future. Ray Sheppard, like Simpson very young (21), over the course of the season earned Ted Sator’s trust and responded with a 38-goal rookie season. Sheppard would go on to be a very good offensive player for about a decade.

Yet their lines relative to Gretzky and Lemieux also remind us that, for as good as they were, neither were driving the boat to the level of those legends (and probably wouldn’t). So you do get some perspective on what some of the best-of-the-best were doing. Lemieux, who was entering his prime, was literally carrying a middling Penguins team on his shoulders, and his ability to do that would bring him, in 1988-89, to convince people that Dan Quinn and Rob Brown were really good.

For frame of reference, in the BTN Era (2007-08 to present) only Ovechkin has been able to come close to the kind of shot volume Lemieux was demonstrating in 1987-88.

NHL Systems, NHL History, and Forward vs. Defense Shooting

Photo by “ravenswing” via Wikimedia Commons

“It’s a matter of systems,” “They don’t have a good system,” “There is no system there”…we hear phrases much like this frequently, and I wonder just how much weight we give the word “system” in a game that flows and relies on instinct and reflex. Teams have some kind of system, no doubt, but it’s funny how the actions of any kind of system pale in comparison to the number of times we notice the classic breakout, setting up of the zone, or cycle. What I’m trying to say is, might we be putting too much emphasis on system, when the results are not clearly resulting in different shot quality? Might we be overstating the role of something practiced for a couple of months, maybe a year or two, versus 15-30 years of playing experience, and all the instincts, common tactics, and reflexes?

In my mind, systems are important in-and-of themselves, because their organization principles are intuitive. Cover the man or take away the passing lanes, apply forecheck pressure or trap in the neutral zone…these base ideas probably need to be there to keep things from devolving into pickup hockey. And you all know that game, where everyone’s a superstar forward and nobody backchecks. Seriously, no wonder you guys can’t ever find two goalies.

Anyway, with my current treasure trove of game-by-game, player-by-player data going back to 1987-88 (thanks to Hockey Reference’s excellent Play Index), I wanted to see just how much the game has evolved since the late 1980s, particularly in regards to defensemen involvement in the offense. We already know that the difference in shots-for per team, per game is 30.4 in 1987-88 to 29.1, so not a heck of a lot has changed in shot generation, and the goals/game per team has changed drastically, from 3.71 in ’87-’88 to 2.75 today. This information alone should suggest we probably haven’t improved too much in regards to what we might call offensive systems. Has defensemen involvement increased, and driven the scoring down? Have teams attempted more forward involvement to improve scoring? Will Guy Boucher ever convince us he has the key to better offense again?

I took data from about 30,000 individual player performances in 1987-88 and about 26,000 in 2012-13; I compared the player’s shot totals to their team totals in those games and derived my %TSh, or percentage of team shots metric, previously used in my piece on Career Charting.

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Friday Quick Graph: Possessing the Puck in 1969, 1981, and 2013

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Photo by Jim Tyron, via Wikimedia Commons

Just finished tracking possession times in a November 15th, 1969 game between the Flyers and the Leafs. This game, when compared to the games from this post, fits virtually in-between them, which is interesting because, unlike with the other two games, the Flyers and Leafs were two teams on the lower end of the spectrum in the league (8th and 9th in 2pS% in a 12-team NHL). Maybe that also contributes to their average possession time of 6.08 sec (n=349) compared to the 1981 game’s 6.15 (n=364) and 2013 game’s 6.17 (n=360). Another observation among these games: the standard deviation for the 1969 and 1981 games is right around 4 seconds, where it’s right at 5 seconds for the 2013 game. I’ll save any deeper ruminations until I have a larger sample, but it’s food for thought.

Not too long ago, I decided I wanted to try out tracking time of possession in historical games, with the hope of eventually having enough data to look into things. I realized it’s going to be a little difficult to get large enough samples of singular teams, but I also realized that we could potentially compare the game as a whole in different eras. I’ve always been of the mind that the game has evolved somewhat, but at its core there are a number of best practices that have kept it pretty much the same game from around the time that the red line was introduced in 1943. I wanted to test that as far back as I could go, though, so with this possession tracking I actually tracked each individual possession rather than just a total time of possession. For this chart, I displayed all those individual possessions as a distribution, longest possessions to the shortest. These three games, the Philadelphia Flyers vs. Toronto Maple Leafs in 1969 (Toronto won 4-2), Edmonton Oilers vs. Philadelphia Flyers in 1981 (Edmonton won 7-5), and Los Angeles Kings vs. St. Louis Blues (St. Louis won 4-2), had some surprising results when compared. As you can see above, the distribution is actually quite close, with the 1981 game seeming to have shorter possessions but then moving above the others in the middle of the line. The 1969 game actually seems like a trendline of the 2013 and 1981 games. The average possession time? 1969: 6.08 seconds, 1981: 6.15 seconds, and 2013: 6.17 seconds. Obviously, I need (and want) more data, but it is a really intriguing start.

The “possession battle” results?

All Situations Possession

  • PHI (47.1%) vs. TOR (52.9%), 1969
  • EDM (53.4%) vs. PHI (46.6%), 1981
  • LAK (51.7%) vs. STL (48.3%), 2013

Possession, Score Close

  • PHI (41.3%) vs. TOR (58.7%)
  • EDM (48.7%) vs. PHI (51.3%)
  • LAK (51.2%) vs. STL (48.8%)

NHL Team History, Possession, and Winning the Stanley Cup

Photo by “JulieAndSteve”, via Wikimedia Commons

Gabe Desjardins dropped a comment over at my Tumblr awhile ago, asking me if I could put together a graph expanding on a metric I came up with, 2-Period Shot Percentage (or 2pS%). 2pS% is an historical possession metric that takes shots-for and shots-against in just the first two periods of a game and expresses it as a percentage for the team being analyzed. The idea was that I was trying to get a rough possession measure from the period that would avoid score effects, or the tendency for teams with a lead to sit on the lead and thus give up shots late in the game. Having recently completed a database of period-by-period shot data going back to 1952-53, I have been able to test this metric a bit and the results were good for 2pS% as a possession measure. Returning to Gabe’s request, he wanted to know if I could chart the 2pS% data from year-to-year, with one line following the league leader in the metric and the other line following the Stanley Cup winner. I’d been curious about this myself; certainly there are a number of different ways to express the value of the metric, but this particular one could be interesting because it toes the line between what the Old and New Guard feel is important in this kind of analysis.

Well, I was right that it would be interesting:
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NHL Career Charting: The Pre-BTN Era and What We Can Still Do With Historical Data

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Photo by “IrisKawling”, via Wikimedia Commons

Hockey statistics have always been fairly historically limited; most of the so-called “fancy stats” have only been tracked (and easily track-able league-wide) back through the 2007-08 season. The prior years have a veil of fog over them, though there is fairly decent shot data going all the way back to the 1952-53 season (thanks to the Hockey Summary Project; I’ve been able to bring the data together), good game-by-game individual player data going back to 1987-88 (thanks to Hockey Reference via Dan Diamond & Associates), and gradually-improving TOI data going back to 1997-98 (thanks to NHL.com and Hockey Reference). Unfortunately, this has lead to a relative dearth of research into the years of the “Pre-BTN” Era, so-called because 2007-08 was the first year we received in-depth, league-wide data from Gabe Desjardins’ Behind the Net stats site and Vic Ferrari’s timeonice.com.

Having a background in history, and also having grown up as a fan of the league in this grey statistical era, I have spent the last couple years trying to compile and present statistics from the Pre-BTN Era in ways that can help provide a window into those years (and possibly inform our understanding of the present-day game). I’m somewhat indebted to Iain Fyffe, a guy who’s been doing similar yeoman’s work much longer than myself at Hockey Prospectus, though more recently he’s been sharing his work at his own site, Hockey Historysis.

The fact of the matter is that there is actually an enormous amount of information out there, and more importantly with graph work we can really do some interesting things. First case in-point is what I call “career charting;” essentially, charting a player’s shots in a game relative to their team’s shots in those same games. Using the metric %TSh, or percentage of team shots, this provides an interesting glimpse into player contributions, workload, and development in the Pre-BTN Era. Adding some artistic (and informational flourish), I present to you Pierre Turgeon:

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