Should teams play with 4 forwards when they’re down late?

Tl;dr

  • There is some evidence to suggest that teams should play with 4 forwards when trailing late in a game.
  • The timing of when to switch to 4 forwards is dependent on how large an impact the switch has on goal scoring rates, however even with a low impact on goal scoring, using 4 forwards still makes sense.

One of the weird things about sports that I find fascinating is how often coaches and players seem to go out of their way to avoid having a negative impact on the game, even at the expense of potential positive impacts. People often seem to prefer to “not lose” rather than to win, which can result in sub-optimal decision making, even in the presence of evidence to show that the correct decision is not being made.

There are many examples of this across sports, but the biggest two in hockey are pulling the goalie and playing with 3 forwards on the power play. Analysts have been arguing for many years now about why teams should pull their goalies earlier, but it’s only been in recent seasons that teams have become more aggressive in getting their netminders out earlier.

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Improving Opposition Analysis by Examining Tactical Matchups

On Monday, I introduced some work on quantifying and identifying team playing styles, which built upon my earlier work on identifying individual playing styles. Today we’re going to discuss how to make this data actionable.

What are the quantifiable traits of successful teams? What plays are they executing that makes them successful? How can we use data to then build a style of play that is more successful than what we’re currently doing? The way we bridge the gap between front office and behind the bench is by providing data to improve their matchup preparation, lineup optimization, and enhance tactical decisions.

This is what I mean by actionable: applying data-driven analysis and decision-making inside the coach’s room and on the ice. All data is from 5v5 situations and is either from the Passing Project or from Corsica.

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Redefining Defensemen based on Transitional Play

Last time, I showed how passing data is a better predictor of future player scoring than existing public metrics. In this piece, I’m going to spend some time talking about how we can more reliably evaluate offensive and defensive contributions from defensemen, which has been difficult due to a lack of data. Not only due to a lack of data, but from a lack of flexibility regarding the identity of the position. Traditionally thought of as existing to defend and “make a good first pass,” I feel this limits the scope of both how we evaluate the position and its responsibilities.

In order to better evaluate defensemen, we need to identify specific metrics that we can tie to future goals. In looking at entry assists (a pass occurring in the neutral or defensive zones that precedes a shot), both for and against, we can quantify how effective that defensemen is at generating offense in transition, as well as suppressing those chances. The importance of those things at the team level is something I’ve previously discussed (transition here and defensive work here with Matt Cane). Once we identify these metrics as having a strong impact on future scoring and goal-suppression, we naturally then reevaluate what the proper roles are for a defensemen, which in turn forces us to reevaluate how we evaluate them.

Personally, I’d like to see us think of them more as fullbacks or midfielders in soccer (this is part of a larger concept of redefining positions and responsibilities, which will be posted in the next month or so, I hope). There are still going to be various types of players based on their individual skill set and team tactics, but supporting play, overlapping on the attack, and distribution are all pillars of what teams should look for. Let’s get to it.

All data is from 5v5 situations and special thanks to Dr. McCurdy for pulling the on-ice player data for me. All non-passing project data is from Corsica.

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#1MinuteTactics – Studying The World Cup Of Hockey

When you bring the best players and coaches together, entertaining things happen. Not only that, but many of the tactical habits employed by elite hockey team are actually not so hard to grasp.

Here are five teaching points brought to us by The World Cup Of Hockey 2016, broken down and served up in just over one minute apiece:

1) Transition Play: Team North America’s Neutral Zone Mastery

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Tactalytics: Using Data to Inform Tactical Neutral Zone Decisions

Breakout - Against 2-1-2...2

Last time, I showed how using data and video evidence can be combined to inform tactical offensive zone decisions. Today, I’m going to do the same thing in the neutral zone. Neutral zone play is something that has been a hot topic among analysts for many years, going back to this paper written by Eric Tulsky, Geoffrey Detweiler, Robert Spencer, and Corey Sznajder. Our own garik16 wrote a great piece covering neutral zone tracking. Jen Lute Costella’s work shows that scoring occurs sooner with a controlled entry than an uncontrolled entry.

However, for all the work that goes into zone entries, there have been few efforts to account for how predictable these metrics are. At the end of the day, what matters is how we can better predict future goal-scoring. Also, in looking at our passing data, what can we also learn about how actions are linked when entering the zone? Does simply getting into the offensive zone matter? Does it matter whether it’s controlled or not? Or, does what happen after you enter the zone matter exponentially more? Lastly, what decisions can we make to improve the team’s process using this data?

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How much is the “best fourth line in hockey” worth?

The New York Islanders agreed to terms Casey Cizikas to a five-year contract extension worth $3.35 million on average per year.

This extension sent shock waves throughout Twitter, Reddit, and discussion boards as it seemed to be a hefty price and term to pay for a member of the team’s fourth line. The Islanders were not without their defenders, though, with many pointing out the “best fourth line” label the trio of Casey Cizikas, Matt Martin, and Cal Clutterbuck are often given.

Prior to debating whether or not the Islander trio is actually the best fourth line ever (or even currently) in hockey, we should ask: How much is the best fourth line in hockey worth?

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Matt Hunwick, Martin Marincin and Quality of Competition

During the offseason, the Toronto Maple Leafs made two small additions to their blueline that were lauded by many in the analytics community. At the draft they traded a fourth round pick and a low-tier prospect for Martin Marincin and on the first day of free agency they signed Matt Hunwick to a low money two-year deal.

Both players had very similar trajectories over the previous three seasons. Marincin had a relative shots percentage of +4.3 while playing 15.7 minutes per night while Hunwick landed at +2.8 percent playing 15.3 minutes. Looking at just the 2014-15 season, Hunwick had the edge at +5.1 in 14.3 minutes to Marincin’s +2.4 in 16.1 minutes. Basically, the Leafs acquired two decent and under-appreciated defensemen who have shown ability to push play in the right direction and for a relatively low cost too.

Flash forward to the culmination of their first seasons as Leafs and opinions of the two couldn’t be more different. Marincin is praised regularly while Hunwick is seen as a proverbial boat anchor.

So what’s changed exactly?

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Can We Accurately Predict Which PK Units Will Score Shorthanded?

Last week I went on Montreal radio and talked about how dangerous the Ottawa Senators’ penalty kill units are. Led by speedy forwards like Curtis Lazar, Jean-Gabriel Pageau and Mark Stone, and with help from puck moving genius Erik Karlsson, the team has feasted on opposing power plays this year to the tune of the highest GF/60 minutes shorthanded in the league since at least 2007-2008. When considering the team’s league worst GA/60 — mixed with a little bit of film — it becomes clear that the Senators yield chance against in exchange for opportunities for on the break. It may not have been intentional at first, but once the team started capitalizing on its rushes, it seems likely coach Dave Cameron gave his players the green light to go, to try and come out on top on aggregate. The result? While being last in GA/60 shorthanded, the Senators are third in GF%. The problem with GF% when it comes to special teams though is that volume matters more when the ice is tilted. Two goals for and Eight goals against isn’t the same as Four goals for and 16 goals against. So goal differential per 60 is a more accurate measure of success on special teams. The Sens are 30th in GD/60 shorthanded, so it’s hard to say the strategy has been that much of a positive for the team (unless, say they’re down a goal and shorthanded near the end of a game).

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Does aggressive play on the penalty kill pay off?

Late last week, Arik Parnass pointed out a particular peculiarity about the Ottawa Senators’ penalty killing so far this year.

While the Sens may be an extreme example, their numbers tell the story of a constant struggle that teams are faced with when killing a penalty: do you focus solely on your own end and do whatever it takes to prevent a goal, or do you allow your forwards to take the play to your opponents, trying for a shorthanded goal and forcing them to defend in a situation where they may not be expecting it.

This risk-reward question is one that’s central to the value of hockey analytics. It’s very easy to make decisions based on personal experience which is so often dominated by memories of things that are out of the ordinary – a coach will likely remember watching his winger get caught deep trying for a shorthanded goal, while forgetting the 2-on-1 opportunity he generated earlier in the game. It’s just as easy, however, for a fan to complain that his favourite team won’t put out their best forwards to aim for a go-ahead shorthanded goal without any data to back up their argument. The challenge for analysts then is to dig through the available data to figure out what past experience has taught us about the overall net impact of playing for a goal on the penalty kill, so that we can make an informed judgement as to what the potential costs and benefits are.

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